

DD/S 60-2049

25 MAY 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William A. Tidwell

SUBJECT : U. S. Intelligence 1965-70

REFERENCE : Proposed Draft Paper by Mr. Tidwell,
same subject

Bill:

I have read with interest your draft paper, "U. S. Intelligence 1965-70", which, as you say, is only a first cut at the problem. There is one assumption that I would like to comment on, and that is your conclusion, in paragraph III (B), that the main outlines of the organization of the Intelligence Community will remain relatively stable during the coming decade. I question seriously this assumption of relative stability.

In the first place, our present intelligence machinery was built on the basis of our World War II experiences and it has not been revamped seriously during the intervening years. By 1970, this machinery will be nearly twenty-five years old, and it would seem almost a certainty that during the 1960s the Community should take a most careful and thorough look at its structure, its system of administration and its support requirements.

In your paper you point out several examples of the added burdens that will be placed on the intelligence machinery during the coming years. You note the growing world population and the political ferment that will develop from growing nationalism in large areas, all resulting in a need for greater intelligence coverage

of many new political entities. Added to this will be the constantly increasing volume of information resulting from technological advances such as improved communications systems, mechanized translation, aerial reconnaissance, and disarmament inspection, plus improved ELINT, COMINT and other sensory systems.

To process this greatly increased and more rapidly moving flow of intelligence, as you point out in paragraph IV (A), there will have to be not only increased reliance on computers and other technical aids, but closer integration of collection and processing systems and more rapid and effective coordination between collection systems.

As to personnel, it may be that during the next decade a change of policy will permit an increase in the personnel strength of the Community, but I think we must assume that the Bureau of the Budget will continue to examine the over-all cost of the intelligence effort in order to spot duplications that might be eliminated, thereby effecting decreases in personnel. If any increases are permitted, I believe that they will be achieved only after the most careful scrutiny of the over-all intelligence effort.

All of this leads me to the conclusion that if we are going to meet successfully the challenges of the years 1965-70, we must not only have modern technical equipment, with enough trained people to run it and to make use of the output, but be certain that our Intelligence Community as a whole is efficiently organized, properly coordinated and free of unnecessary duplications. I have no specific recommendations, but I do think that the Community should be prepared to take a good, hard look at its over-all structure with a view to modernizing the system wherever it needs it. In fact, I think that if the Community does not do this for itself it will continue to be harassed by the Bureau of the Budget, Hoover Commission-type Task Forces, and the Congress.

L. K. White

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